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Abstract-A mechanism for a decision maker ethically bound to pursue the best avail- 
able course of action is studied. The model allows for feedback information to be input 
for each cycle of decision makin,. D This type of information-feedback loop is relevant 
to many real decision making situations. Equations describing the updated expected 
utilitv in terms of the learning factor are given and a discussion follo\vs as to when 
learn-ing takes place. Ir is then shown that these estimates converge to the appropriate 
values. Moreover these estimators form a martingale or a submarCngale, thus allowing 
the analysis of when and how the decision makers can terminate the feedback decision 
making loop. Several strategies are discussed as well as the corresponding probabilities 
of ending the loop in a finite amount of time. 
0. INTRODUCTION 
Often the concept of information is used, rather specifically, in the sense of Shannon and 
Weaver[l]. However, as pointed out in their work, information may have at least three 
distinct levels: *‘technical.” “semantic” (see the works of Winograd[?] and Woods[3]) 
and “effectiveness” (see the works of Zunde[4], Bandyopadhyay[S] and Marshak[6]. For 
an extensive discussion on different approaches to information we also refer the reader 
to the article by Kampe de Feriet[7]. While a large volume of papers is dedicated to 
communication and semantics, relatively few papers have dealt with the effectiveness 
problem. The model of a generalized information system (GE) developed by Yovits and 
Abilock[8] and more recently by Yovits et al.[9] is an important step in rhat direction. In 
this model both the action space A and the outcome space 0 are finite and there exists a 
utility function that monotonically maps the decision maker’s (DM’s) order of preference 
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for each action-outcome combination into real numbers. That is, there exists a function 
II: A X 0 + R having the property that if combination (ai, o,) is preferred to (a;*, Oj*) 
then Llij > ~;*j*, where llij = u(ni, oj). Since utility functions are unique up to linear 
transformations, we can, without loss of generality, assume ll;j 2 0 for all (i, j). If m and 
n denote the number of actions and outcomes, respectively, the utility function is then 
represented by the m x n matrix. 
U = (Uij); 16i<m,lsjjrz. 
U is subjective in the sense that it reflects the DM’s preference. Since we do not deal 
with goal uncertainty (as defined by Yovits et al.[9]) the matrix U is presumed to be known 
to the DM. For a more detailed discussion of utility functions we refer to either Von 
Neumann and Morgenstern[ IO] or Ferguson[ I I]. 
Since there is uncertainty as to which action will produce a given outcome, the natural 
way to proceed is to choose the course of action (CO4) that will maximize expected 
utility. That is, pick COA ni that maximizes 
Ui = i llijpij t 
j=l 
(0.1) 
where pij is the probability that outcome oj will occur if COA ni is taken. Since the DM 
does not know these probabilities, he does not know the true values of I/i. (Yovits et 
al.]91 refer to this as executional uncertainty.) This model has been applied to a variety 
of realistic situations. Medical, economic, agricultural and business applications of this 
model are given in the previously cited paper and its sequel (Yovits et al.[12]. 
Since the exact value of Ui is unknown, it will be treated as a random variable. The 
best the DM can do is to follow the above strategy where at each step the value of U; 
used in the decision making process is an estimate of the unknown random variable Cl;. 
The DM will start with Eo.i, his initial guess for CJi. However, because of the feedback 
nature of this model, each individual decision will generally provide more information 
allowing increasingly better estimates of the Ui. 
In this paper we describe a method whereby the DM can utilize the feedback data to 
improve his estimates while at the same time attempting to choose the best COA based 
on current information. The present paper deals with the following two important ques- 
tions: (1) When should the DM change the COA? and (2) When should the DM stop? 
We will show that our estimates have certain desirable statistical properties. In par- 
ticular a sequence of these estimators constitute a martingale (MG). It is this MG property 
that will allow us to naturally define and analyze stopping rules; also, it will be used to 
show that our estimators converge in the mean (strong convergence) to the unknown 
parameters, in our case Ui. In particular we will show that this decision process will 
eventually stabilize so that changes in the expected utility function will fall below a fixed 
threshold. This is closely related to the gambler’s ruin problem where the gambler playing, 
even a fair game, is eventually unable to bet as his fortune falls below the minimum amount 
allowable for a bet. It may be of interest to note that martingales were at first studied to 
precisely analyze the fall and rise of fortunes in gambling; for more on this we refer to 
Doob[l3J. 
This paper consists of four sections: Decision Procedures, Statistical Properties of the 
Estimators, Stopping Rules, and Formal Proofs of the Results. For the sake of readability 
the formal proofs of our results have been deferred to the last section, which also contains 
some of the more technical concepts and some known results used in our proofs. The 
first three sections contain the statements of the results and a discussion of their meaning. 
Heuristic arguments have also been included in these three sections. 
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In Section 1. a description of our model is given and a comparison is made with the 
Yovits et al.[9] model. A description of thz updating process is given yielding the learning 
factor. A discussion as to when learning takes place then follows. The DM’s decision 
mechanism is then described. In Section 2. we establish that our estimators are either 
martingales or submartingales. and this allows us to show that our estimators converge 
to the desired values. In Section 3. we describe several strategies available to the DXl to 
stop the decision making feedback loop. It is important to know when the probability of 
stopping in a finite amount of time is one. 
Additional problems to be studied will be outlined in the concluding remarks. 
1. DECISION PROCEDURES 
The model described in the previous section is in many respects similar to the basic 
model of statistical decision theory in that the criterion for picking a COA is to maximize 
the expected utility. Initially, prior to any decision the DM makes an estimate, based on 
his experience or subjective feeling, of the expected utility of COA cli. 
Here we follow the notation convention that a dot in the subscript indicates summation 
over the corresponding index. e.g. 8:“’ = s f3:;). The 0iy’ thus reflect the DM’s original 
belief that COA ni will result in outcome oj. In general after a COA has been determined 
for the L-th time (i.e. on the X-th cycle of the feedback loop), the estimated expected utility. 
for COA cli will be 
(1.1) 
where 9:’ represents the weight that the DM puts on the pair ((1,. oi) on the X-th cycle. 
Of course in order to reflect the DM’s changing belief as information accumulates, some 
upgrading scheme for the ej, is necessary. 
An upgrading scheme with interesting mathematical properties is obtained by defining 
pJ!M = 
e!‘_- 1) + 1 if on trial k COA ai is taken and outcome 0; results, 
lJ &I) 
U otherwise. (1.2) 
The estimated expected utilities obtained by this upgrading scheme will form a martingale 
sequence under reasonable restrictions. Further discussion is deferred to Section 4. 
We now set 
ix,; = i/e+) 
1. if COA ni is taken on the kth cycle, 
= 0 otherwise. 
If on the kth cycle COA cl; results in outcome 0,. it follows from (1.7) that 
which can be written as 
(1.3) 
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Finally, taking (1.3) into account, we obtain 
&.; = (1 - A,.;)&_ , ,i + h~,illi,. (1.4) 
Of course, (1.4) is also valid if COA LZ; has not been taken since in that case Xk.i was set 
to 0 and we simply have Lk,i = LA- 1.i. It should be noted that ( 1.1) strongly resembles 
line (6) in Yovits et aI.[9]. If the DM initially had no idea vvhat probabilities to associate 
with the various possible outcomes under COA ni, he would be likely to set 8;) = l/r1 so 
that 0i. = 1. In this situation our computations are equivalent to setting the learning factor 
constant Kx = I, in the paper cited above. In the sense that we allow the Dhf’s prior 
probabilities to be other than l/n. our model generalizes the Yovits-Foulk-Rose model. 
We now would like to study the learning factor A&,; of the DM. The natural question 
is first to find a necessary and sufficient condition for the sequence Xk,i to converge. It 
should be noted that (1.4) shows that the smaller Xx.; is, the more learning has taken place 
as the I[ij term (i.e. the new data) has less effect on the expected utility. On the other 
hand. if hk.i is close to 1, new data have a much greater impact on the expected utility. 
Following Yovits et a1.[9] we say that learning takes place if Ax.; converges to 0 for all i. 
It can be seen from Eq. (1.4) that if the estimates converge. then learning must take place. 
In subsequent sections we show that the estimators .&?:x.j converge in mean and also 
with probability 1 (provided COA (zi is taken infinitely often) to the actual value of Ui 
defined by (0.1). Of course, differences in the weights 0Lj will affect the rate ofconvergence. 
In the Yovits-Foulk-Rose formulation that rate is influenced by the learning factor. We 
already have pointed out that a high value for our learning factor increases the weight 
given to new information; see (I .4). In fact, Eq. ( 1.4) essentially determines how the DM 
picks the COA as he proceeds from cycle to cycle. Assume that the DM chooses action 
CI, on the kth cycle. Keeping in mind that the DM seeks to maximize the expected utility 
we set 
(1.5) 
The decision to choose CI, implies & I = I$, _ , ..y. Equation (I .4) becomes 
&.i = (1 - A&‘x- I.., + AL,II,~ if i = s, 
= Ex- ,.; ifi#s. (1.6) 
Now if u,,. > Ek_, = Lk-,l..vr then by (1.6), i?k.,s > i?_,. In this case the DM will stay 
with COA a.F on the (k + 1)th cycle. Even if II,, < ,!?- , , COA a, will be taken on the 
next trial if 
115, > Lh- I., - (1 - A~,,)~~- ,.,lLL. where & _ , ., = Max f?,_,.;. ( 1.7) 
iT\ 
COA a, is the action that yields the second best estimated expected utility prior to the 
&th cycle. It was, of course, passed over in favor of COA (I, which yielded the highest 
expected utility. 
The DM’s decision may thus be summarized as follows: given that COA a., was chosen 
on the kth cycle and outcome o, results, if (1.7) holds, the DM continues with COA n, 
on the next cycle. If the inequality in (1.7) is reversed, take COA clr as defined above. 
The above decisions do not provide for ties. If a tie occurs [i.e. equality in (1.7)1. the DM 
may (1) stay with COA a, (go with the winner strategy): (1) take COA CI~ (variety is the 
spice of life strategy); (3) flip a coin (randomized break of ties). 
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It should be noted that the DM’s mechanism for deciding on a COA is highly dependent 
on his utility function. Thus the DM will tend to stay with COA’s that provide high 
expected utilities and will not change COA’s simply to obtain new information. Such 
behavior is relevant to situations (e.g. clinical trials) in which the DM is ethically bound 
to pursue what he believes to be the best COA. 
2. STATISTICAL PROPERTIES OF THE ESTIMATORS 
Most of the results given in this section hinge on the fact that the sequential estimators 
given in the previous section (i.e. ,& and &) constitute martingales (MG) or submartin- 
gales (SMG). Rigorous proofs for our results, for the most part. will be given in the 
Appendix. In this section we give the definitions, results and some heuristic arguments. 
A sequence of random variables forms a SMG if 
E[ Yk_, I Y,, Y2. . . . Ykl 2% YL. 
If the above inequality is replaced by equality, the sequence is a MG. For classical results 
on MG and SMG we refer the reader to Doob[ IS], while for more recent results the works 
of Chatteji[l3, 141, Scalora[lS] and Metivier[l6] should be consulted. 
In Section 4 it will be shown that for every fixed i the sequence .&:x.; constitutes a MG. 
Using this fact we will also show that 
Ek.i * I/i a.s. (2.1) 
provided COA ai is taken infinitely often (i.0.). The designation a.s. means almost sure 
convergence, i.e. convergence with probability one. It is important to stress here that not 
only does kk.i approach Ui with probability one (for all COA cl; that occur i.o.) but that 
this convergence holds no matter what the initial weights may be. 
Also it will be shown that 
for all COA ni that occur i.o. This says that not only do the estimates &.i of the true 
expected utility approach cl; with probability one. they also approach I/; in the mean 
(strong convergence). Finally it will also be shown that I%~ [as defined in (l.S)] is a SXIG. 
Similar convergence theorems hold for I?~ (which may be viewed as the estimators of max 
I/i). Thus all the estimators introduced converge to the true value that they estimate. in 
mean and with probability one. Each DM will evaluate events with his own initial prob- 
abilities (i.e. @j’s) and update the successive I$’ according to the outcomes observed: 
however, convergence is independent of the initial weights. In the next section. using the 
fact that our sequences are MG’s and SMG’s, respectively, \ve analyze stopping rules. 
3. STOPPING RULES 
In many situations the DM may not wish to continue the decision-action-feedback cycle 
indefinitely but hopes to ultimately choose a final COA. We now consider several strat- 
egies for determining when to stop the process. 
Strategy I. For a given threshold 6 > 0 and a positive integer L, terminate the process 
at cycle Kl (Kl depends on L and S), where Kl denotes the cycle for which 
I i-K, - LI-, I< s for the Lth time 
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The rationale for this strategy is that as the variability of the estimates of the maximum 
expected utility falls below a certain threshold. new information Lvill have very little impact 
on the estimates of the maximum expected utility and the feedback loop may be termi- 
nated. Any integer valued random variable (such as Kl) that defines a stopping time is 
called an extended stopping time. In order for a strategy to qualify as a bonafide stopping 
rule, it must stop in finite time with probability one. Since the process 2, converges with 
probability one, successive differences cannot indefinitely exceed 6: this implies that Kl 
is finite. Strategy 1 thus defines a stopping rule. Rigorous arguments are again deferred 
to Section 4. 
Stmteg,v 2. Again given a threshold 6 > 0 and a positive integer L. the process is 
terminated as soon as one COA has been chosen L times, provided the threshold condition 
( I!?,, - LK2_ I ( < 6 has been met. The cycle on which the DM stops with this strategy 
is denoted by K2. With strategy 1 it is conceivable that two or more COA may produce 
approximately the same estimates of Lk-. Thus strategy 1 could call for termination without 
establishing a preferrred COA. Strategy 2 requires that one of the COA should occur at 
least L times before termination and in this sense seeks out a dominant COA. Of course 
if COA cl; and nj have both occurred L - 1, dominance would not be strongly established. 
A formal proof will be given in Section 4 showing that K2 is a stopping time. 
Strategy 3. In this strategy the process continues until one of the COA’s produces 
the same outcome L times and the threshold condition ) LK3 - tK3 _, ) < 6 has been met. 
The last cycle for this strategy is, of course, labeled K3. This strategy is useful when the 
DM wants to ascertain which outcomes are most likely to occur as a consequence of 
those actions which lead to high expected utilities. Strategy 3 will usually take more cycles 
for termination than the t\vo previous strategies. (It. of course, should be kept in mind 
that the same action repeated does not necessarily lead to the same outcome.) If the DM 
wants to arrive at a final decision as quickly as possible and if he is not particularly 
interested in the estimation of P[outcome = Oj [ COA = cr;], the DM will most likely opt 
for strategy I or strategy 1. Since there are II possible outcomes, any given COA must 
produce one of the outcomes at least L times by the time it has been taken 
L* = n(L - 1) + 1. 
Thus 
K3(6, L) s K2(6, Lx). (3.1) 
Since strategy 2 yields a stopping time, (3. I) shows that K3 is also a stopping time. 
Before proceeding to a discussion of other stopping strategies, we note that if K* 
denotes any integer valued random variable leading to a stopping rule, 
E&-l 3 E&1 for X- < K”. 
This result, shown in Section 4. follows from the fact that the process L, is a SMG. This 
states that on the average the DM is in a better position at stopping time than at any prior 
cycle, no matter what stopping rule is used. 
Because & forms a SMG, the &, will converge and hence the threshold condition will 
ultimately always be satisfied. Even if the process is not actually terminated, eventually 
1 & - kk_ I 1 < 6 will hold with probability one. Unless two or more COA’s lead to the 
same maximized expected utility, this implies that the same COA is repeatedly taken. 
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On the other extreme, consider the situation in which the D&I wants to make a final 
decision without necessarily uaiting for the SMG k, to converge. Strategy 9 and strategy 
3 can be terminated by deleting the threshold condition. Hovvever, particularly with strat- 
egy 3, if 6 is moderate and L fairly large. it is likely that the threshold condition will be 
satisfied on the same cycle as the other conditions. 
Strategy 4. Here the process stops as soon as & > .\I, vvhere :\I is some constant. 
Since 
II* = mm ll;j < EK < max lli, = I(*, 
M should be picked in the interval (II*, II”). Of course. if M is too small. the process 
could be stopped well before the limit of & is reached: if M is picked too large. the process 
may never stop. Thus strategy 3 is not a stopping rule in the strict sense (i.e. termination 
does not take place with probability one) as with the previous strategies. Strategy 4 leads 
to an extended stopping time. It will be shown in the next section that 
That is. the probability of stopping on or before the kth cycle with strategy 4 is at most 
(l/M)E 1 i?, I. The next three strategies truncate strategy 1 to insure that we have strict 
stopping times. 
Strategy 5. K5 = minimum (Kl, KJ). 
Strategy 6. K6 = minimum (K2, K4). 
Stmtegy 7. K7 = minimum (K3, K-l). 
Since Kl, KZ, K3 are stopping times. it is clear that Kj, K6 and K7 are also bonafids 
stopping times. 
4. FORMAL PROOFS OF THE RESULTS 
The basic mathematical structure underlying the probabilistic aspects of the model is 
the probability space (0, F, PO). All random variables discussed in our paper are presumed 
to be defined on R and to be F measurable, where F is a u-field of subsets of R (i.e. the 
events). Pe is a family of probability measures where 
ranges over some set D. Recall from Section 1 that the DM is free to choose the initial 
weights as he sees fit. The set D consists of all possible choices of these weights. Another 
restriction on this class, hereafter called the class of admissible probability measures, will 
be given later. 
We now introduce the following family of random variables: Xl,X-’ = I if on the kth cycle 
the COA is ai and the outcome is oj. Otherwise we set Xi:’ = 0. The sequence of random 
matrices 
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defines the “history” of the decision process through the X-th trial. More formally let 
Hk = F(X““; 1s q S x-) 
denote the o-field generated by this history. The estimator .!?k,i which, since it depends 
on the particular DM, should readily be denoted by .&JO). is defined by 
Lk,;(O) = Ee[Ui 1 Hx_]. (4.1) 
The subscript 0 on the right side of (3.1) indicates that the conditional expectations are 
taken with respect to Pe. Thus by the formal definition of conditional expectation, 
IA Eo[ r/i 1 Hkl dPe = JA ui df’e 3 (4.9) 
where A is any event in Hk, and EH[ Ui 1 Hk] is HA measurable. 
The obvious restriction on the class of admissible probability measures alluded to earlier 
is that the conditional expectation given in (4.1) must be equal to the right side of (1.1). 
It can be shown[ 111 that this equality holds whenever the admissible class is defined so 
that the joint probability distribution of the unknown variables (pii, pi?, . . . , pi,) is a 
Dirichlet distribution with parameters (0$“, f@‘, . . . , 9li’) for all 1 s i s m. 
We now prove a series of results that have been used implicitly or explicitly in previous 
sections. 
PROPOSITION 1. 
(1) &j forms a MG for every fixed i. 
(2) Ee[Lk-.il = EfI[Uil. 
Proof. We start by showing (2). From (4.1) and (4.2) 
= Ui dPe. (4.3) 
By setting A = R in (4.3) we see that (2) holds. To show (1) we first note that the histories 
Hk form an expanding collection of u-fields, i.e. 




Gk.i = F[&: 1 c cy c k]. 
(4.4) 
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The first equation follows from standard properties of conditional expectations and from 
the fact that G~,i C HA. The second follovvs from (1.1). and the last follows from the fact 
that i?,,j is Gk,i measurable. The above equations show that f?,,i forms a hlG. by definition. 
We call a sequence of random variables YL uniformly integrable (UI) if 
and 
lim lim 
X-z K-a? Yk dP = 0. 
(-1.6) 
PROPOSITION 3. Lk,i is UI for all fixed i. 
Proof. That l?,,; satisfies (4.5) is obvious by 
also that by (I .2) 
1 i-k,j / S Max 
the second part of Proposition I. Notice 
I ll1.i 1. (4.7) 
Equation (4.6) then is satisified as soon as .Y exceeds Max;j 1 11;j I. 
PROPOSITION 3. If cl; occurs i.o. then kA,i converges to I/j a.s. PH for all 8 in D. 
Proof. The proof follows from Proposition Z and from classical results on hlG (see 
Doob[ 131, for example). 
Thus no matter what initial 8 the DM may choose, the estimates of C’; converge to L‘: 
with probability one provided of course that cl; occurs i.o. 
We say that a sequence Yk of random variables converges to the random variable Yin 
the Lp sense if 
lim E[ / Yk - Y I”] = 0. 
k- -2z 
There p is some number 
convergence in the mean. 
greater or equal to one. When p = 1, this definition yields 
PROPOSITION 4. .kk,i converges to I/i in the Lp sense, provided of course that COA ni 
occurs i.0. 
Proof. The proof folows from Proposition 3 and the bounded convergence theorem: 
see (4.7) and Doob[lS]. 
Given any sequence of random variables Y,, by an extended stopping time we mean 
an integer valued vandom variable K* such that the set {K* = p} is in F( Y,, Y2, . . . . 
Y,). If moreover P(K* < xc) = 1. K* is called a stopping rule. 
PROPOSITION 5. For any stopping rule K* 
Ed&*(e)1 z= E&WI for k s K*. 
Proof. Let k,(e) denote the stopped process. That is, 
&(e) = i(e) if,k<K* 
= &-(e) if k > K*. 
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By (3.7). E 1 i,(8) 1 is finite and 
.v_.z (K’>.V} EA.(e) dP ri‘ _r lim I s Mau llji lim P,(K* 2 N) = 0. 
The hypothesis is of the optional sampling theorem is then satisfied (see Doob[lSl) and 
since &(0) is a SMG, so is &(e). Hence 
for all rl 3 k. The proof is then completed by taking 4 5 K” 5 k. This says that on the 
average the expected utility is greater at stopping time than at prior times. 
PROPOSITION 6. Given any positive number 6 and 0 in D 
Pd I L(e) - &-de) 1 < 8 i.0.) = 1 
for all 0 in D. 
Proof. By Proposition 3, &(I!)) converges to Maxi I/i a.s. PO. Thus the event { 1 kk(f3) 
- &_ ,(e) 1 2 6 i.o.} has probability zero, which completes the proof. 
PROPOSITION 7. Kl as defined by stragegy 1 is a stopping rule. 
Proof. {Kl = p} is the event that the absolute differences between consecutive pairs 
of .&,. &, . . . are less than 6. Hence {Kl = cl} is in F[E,, kZ, . . . , &,I and 
Pe(Kl < e) = PH( 1 h(e) - i-k_,(e) 1 < 6 at least L times) 
b PH( I &(e) - i?_,(e) / < 6 i.0.) = 1. 
The last line follows from Proposition 6. 
A sequence of integer valued random variables rnk constitutes sampling variables with 
respect to the sequence of random variables Jo if 
and 
{rnk = (I} is in F(Yl, Y7, . . . , yy) 
for all k. We now would like to show that K2 as defined in strategy 2 is a stopping rule. 
For this purpose we let rnL denote the k th time that any one COA is taken for at least the 
Lth time (L is fixed). For example, if L = 3 and if the first ten COA’s are n2, 04. no, 01, 
~12, aI, CI~, aI, nl, aI, then ml = 6 (because on trial 6, CI~ has appeared three times), MZ 
= 8 (because on trial 8, n, has appeared four times), m3 = 9 (because on trial 9. 02 has 
appeared three times) and ma = 10 (because on trial 10, nl has appeared five times). At 
times we will write mk(L) for mk. 
PROPOSITION 8. The nap as given above form a sequence of sampling variables for 
&(e), where X- 2 1 and 1 s i < m. 
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The proof is straightforward and will be omitted. We now se[ 
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Lk = m(L - 1) f k. 
PROPON’ION 9. 
Proof. By trial L, at least one COA has been chosen L or more times. thus ml s L,. 
For k Z= 2 create a subsequence c:f;‘le) by deleting those trials Lvhich generate m4, 1 s 
q < k - 1. If m,(k) denotes the first sampling variable for this subsequence, then 
m,(k) c L,. 
But 
ml(k) = ml, - (k - 1). 
Thus 
which implies 
171 I, - (X: - I) S m(L - 1) + I. 
We now define i‘k.j(0) = k?,,,,,(ej. L?k,i s called the sampled sequence. 
PROPOSITION 10. &JO) is a MG. 
Proof. This is the statement of the optional samping theorem: see Doob[l31. 
PROPOSITION 11. Lk,i(O) is UI. 
The proof is clear since (1.7) shows that ~~,i is bounded for all k and i. 
PROPOSITION 12. lim+r L,-:,(0) = maxi I/i a.s. PO for all 0 in D. where C, = maxi l?A.i. 
Proof. The proof follows from Proposition 9, Proposition 10 and from the fact that 
the maximum is a continuous function by applying the SMG convergence theorem to I!% 
= maxi ri,.i. 
Let kl(&, 1) denote the stopping time obtained by applying sxategy 1 to the sequence 
&with L = 1. 
PROPOSITION 13. kl(&, 1) is a stopping rule. 
Proof. By Proposition 11, Proposition 6 is true for &;;(I!)). The proof then proceeds as 
in Proposition 7. 
PROPOSITION 13. K(6. L) as defined by strategy 1 is a stopping rule. 
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Proof. {Kl(S. L) = (I} denotes the event that 
/ max ,6‘,.;(e) - max II?,_ ,Jt3) 1 < 8 
and 
( m:x &,.;(0) - max &,_ ,Jt3) 1 2 6 for all rrlx < (I. 
i 
Hence {K2(6, L) = (I} is in F(&: I =G i c m, I s X: s (I). 
To show that K1(6, I.1 is finite with probability one we note that 
KZ(6, L) = n7K,(6, I). 
Hence 
P,,(K?_(S. f.) < x) = Pfj(wl~,(8. I) < ) = 2 Pe(m(L - 1) + kl@. 1) < x) 
= P(f?l(&. I) < x) = 1. 
Equation (4.8) follows from Proposition 9 and (4.9) from Proposition 13. 
PROPOSITION 15. K3(6. L) as defined by strategy 3 is a stopping rule. 
(4.8) 
(4.9) 
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition I4 and will be omitted. 
PROPOSITION 16. 
P”(,y;L .t,,w > Ml 6 (l/MI&I 1 m) I. 
-‘ - 
Proof. Since ,!?k(e) is a SMG, the result is an immediate consequence of Theorem 
5.13 found in Breiman[l7]. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this work we have looked at two basic problems: (1) How and when does a change 
in COA occur, and (2) How and when does a DM end the feedback decision making loop. 
Central to the decision making process was the utility function which was fixed. A natural 
extension of our results would be to introduce possible changes in the utility function and 
thereby describe what Yovits et al.[9] refer to as “goal uncertainty.” Another possible 
source of investigation is to restrict attention to the estimates of piJ = PIO = oj 1 COA 
= a;]. Stopping times would then involve the changes in accumulated information drop- 
ping below a threshold, The accumulated information, following the motivation of Yovits 
et al.[9], could be defined by quantities such as CL= 1 ( ,GA+ I,ij - pk.;j I. where fik_.ij would 
be the estimators on the kth cycle of PIO = qj 1 COA = (Ii]. 
Finally, in this setting the relation between the accumulated information and the stop- 
ping time should be investigated. These questions will be the subject of another paper. 
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